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IN THE SUPR.El\1E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DIANE- WALCH REICK, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
DONALD TH0\1AS REICK, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
___________________________ ) 
SUPREME COURT NO. 
18229 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATBV1ENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Respondent filed an Order to Show Cause and Affidavit 
In Re Modi fi cat ion of Decree, seeking, inter an 
increase in child support, recovery of heal th and ace ident 
insurance not maintained by Appellant in accordance with the 
order of the Court and recovery of child support withheld 
unilaterally by Appellant without order of the Court. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On a hearing in the lower court, the Court granted an 
increase in the child support, allowing to be deducted from 
the child support alimony allegedly wrongfully obtained by 
Respondent and without granting compensation for additional 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 1 
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insurance expended by Respondent and which was part of the 
Court ordered obi iga t ion in the Decree of Divorce of the 
Respondent, and recovery of funds expended by Respondent as 
medical care for the child. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an additur by the Court from the 
amount wrongfully withheld from child support by the 
Appellant; child support in accordance with the Judgment of 
the lower court; and costs of insurance and additional care 
for the handicapped minor child, together with disaffirrnance 
of claim by Appellant making allegation of unclean hands of 
Respondent as an alleged bar to equitable judgment for 
Respondent. 
STATEVIENT OF FACTS 
The wife, who was the plaintiff in the lower court, 
will be referred to herein as the Respondent, and the bus-
band, who was the defendant in the lower court, wil 1 be 
referred to herein as the Appellant. 
Objection is made to pages 6A, 6B, 6C, and 60 of 
Appellant's Brief, that in spite of a trial and full 
opportunity to introduce all exhibits essential to the trial 
of the matter in the lower court, the Appellant has included 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 2 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in the App e 1 1 ant ' s Br i e f page s 6 A , 6 B , 6 C , and 6D as 
Exhibits, without same having been introduced into the lower 
court, and without petition for consent of the Supreme Court 
prior to including extraneous exhibits in the matter before 
the Court, same being enclosed without knowledge or consent 
of the Respondent and counsel for the Respondent. 
Respondent and Appellant were intermarried on 
November 18, 1967, and had as issue of the marriage a 
da_ughter named Daniel le, who at the time of the divorce of 
the Appellant and Respondent on May 26, 1972, was nine 
months of age. (R 1) At the time of the divorce, Appellant 
was steadily employed and making $800. 00 per month, and at 
the time of the instant Show Cause Order and hearing of 
same, the Appellant was making the sum of $25,776.00 per 
year or $2,148.00 per month(T 214), which is obviously more 
than two and one-half times increase in earnings. 
The Uniform Child Support Schedule of the Second 
Judicial District Court shows that for a gross earnings of 
$2,148.00 per month, a minimal support payment for a single 
child family would be the sum of $232.00 per month. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 6A) 
The parties entered into a Stipulation prior to the 
granting of a Decree of Divorce, and the Stipulation 
provided for the payment by the Appellant to the Respondent 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 3 
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of $150.00 per month for child support, and $50.00 as and 
for alimony, for a total monthly payment of $200.00, and 
further provided that the Appellant maintain a pol icy of 
accident and health insurance, with the minor child as the 
beneficiary thereof. (R 6-7) The Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and the Judgment and Decree of Divorce 
reiterated the requirements above of the Stipulation 
(R 8-12), without any statement whatsoever as to a condition 
subsequent, such as remarriage, terminating or nul 1 i fying 
the payment of child support and alimony upon remarriage of 
the Respondent . 
The Respondent remarried on August 29, 1977 (T 4), and 
divorced shortly ther·eafter. The Appellant remarried on 
May 27, 1972 (T 172), and Appellant's wife was employed at a 
salary of $8,000.00 per year. (T 188) 
Appellant dropped insurance on his minor daughter and 
did not carry it for the period of 1977, 1978, and 1979, and 
t hen re i n s t a t e d i t i n Sep t emb e r , 1 9 8 0 . ( T 1 5 2) 
While the Respondent was remarried from August 29, 
,1977, to June 21, 1979, for a period of 22 months (R 42), 
she did not advise the Appellant of the remarriage, in that 
the Appellant threatened to lower the child support if the 
Respondent did get married (R 43), and in addition, the 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 4 
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Appellant sold the Opel GT motor vehicle which was awarded 
to the Respondent by the Decree of Divorce (R 11-12), and 
the Appellant did not reimburse the Respondent for $815.10, 
paid by the Respondent for medical care of the daughter 
(R 44), and for $1,054.00 paid for special remedial teaching 
of the ten-year old daughter (R 48) . The Respondent further 
had no reason to know or believe that marriage was a con-
dition subsequent to the marriage, in that nothing in the 
Stipulation, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
Decree of Divorce made any reference to remarriage as ter-
minating the alimony. (R 8-12) 
The Appellant, upon being advised of the remarriage of 
the Respondent, terminated the payment of alimony of $50.00 
per month, and in addition, deducted $50.00 per month from 
the meager child support awarded to the Respondent (T 153), 
without seeking an order of the Court, or without any modi-
fication of the Judgment and Decree of the Court, either as 
to alimony or as child support. 
The action brought by the Respondent on an Order to 
Show Cause and Modification of the Decree of Divorce 
(R 16-20) , was a commencement of the instant act ion before 
this Court. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 5 
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ARGU\1ENT 
POINT I. 
DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN INCREASING CHILD SUPPORT UPON DETERMINA-
TION OF SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN EARNINGS OF 
APPELLANT AND COSTS OF MAINTENANCE AND 
SUPPORT OF MINOR CHILD. 
At the time the Appellant and Respondent were divorced 
in 197 2, the income of the Appellant was $800. 00 per month 
(T 214), and the evidence introduced at the time of trial 
established the earnings of the Appellant at $2,148.00 per 
month, for a total gross earnings of $25,776.00 per year. 
(T 214) 
The Appellant had also remarried on May 27, 1972 
(T 172), and his new wife continued her employment making 
$ 8 , 0 0 0 . 0 O per ye a r ( T 18 8) • In spite of the substantial 
increase in income the Appellant seeks to characterize this 
more than 250% increase in the Appellant's own salary, as 
"due to inflation". (Appellant's Brief, p. 11) The Appel-
lant entered into a Stipulation and Agreement at the time of 
the original divorce on May 26, 1972, to pay $150.00 per 
month for support of their only child, Danielle, a daughter, 
and an additional sum of $50.00 per month as and for 
alimony (T 84), and has brought an Appeal to this Court on 
an alleg·ation of abuse of discretion of the Court. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 9) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 6 
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The lower court heard testimony as to the earnings and 
needs of the parties involved, and as to their allegations 
o f cos t s of l iv i ng , and made a de t e rm i n at i on th a t des p i t e 
the plea of the Respondent that the sum of not less than 
$250. 00 was necessary for the support of the minor chi Id, 
who is now ten years of age, and where the family is 
residing in California, that the sum of $225.00 was, under 
the circumstances, reasonable child support to award to the 
Respondent. 
This Court, stated in !souf~~!~ !~ !so~!~~is, 14 Utah 
2d 273, 382 P.2d 412 (1963), that it may review the evidence 
and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, 
only where the division and award in the lower court was 
unjust and inequitable, and was an abuse of discretion based 
upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case 
before the Court. 
In Kiesel v. 6 14 P. 2d 13 7 4 (Oct . , 19 8 0) , this 
court held: 
Trial court is justified in modifying a 
prior decree of divorce where the 
parties seeking modification proves a 
substantial and permanent change of cir-
cumstances necessitating the 
modification. Re 1 evan t to such a show-
ing are changes in the income of the 
supporting spouse, and increased needs 
on the part of the children. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 7 
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In the instant matter before the Court, we find that 
the Respondent moved to Fresno, California, in order to 
improve her earning ability (T 87) , and in addition to the 
higher costs of living in California, had the care of a 
minor daughter who had a learning disability, and for so 
long as the Respondent could afford it, was entered into an 
educationally handicapped school at Palo Alto, California 
(T 90), but was forced to withdraw her from the special 
school as being· too expensive (T 91) , but ut i 1 i zed every 
effort to advance the learning disability of the daughter by 
placing her in tutoring and reading centers. (T 92, 97) The 
Respondent was able to move to Palo Alto (T 102), by obtain-
ing a job with the U.S. Geological Survey. The Court, in 
its final Judgment, did not award to the Respondent $250.00 
monthly for which the Respondent prayed, nor give the 
,$232.00, as set forth in the Uniform Child Support Schedule, 
but awarded the sum of $225.00, and the Judgment of the 
Court, while neither a judgment of joy to either the Respon-
dent or the Appellant, was definitely not a denial of the 
Appellant's constitutional right to due process of law, nor 
is there any evidence whatsoever before the Court, and in 
the record before the Court, evidencing that the Court did 
anything but use its own discretion deriving at the facts of 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 8 
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the matter presented to the Court, and weighing the 
credibility of the witnesses and any of their se 1 f-serving 
computations of living expenses, and no endless recitation 
of citations of other cases can change the actual record 
before the Court. 
The evidence before the Court is competent and relevant 
as to the current earnings of both the Appellant and the 
Respondent, and no amount of rhetoric, huffing or puffing 
can alter the fact that a stipulated and agreed $150.00 per 
month child support for a nine-month of daughter in 1972, at 
a time when the Appellant was earning $800.00 per month is 
still a viable amount of support for a ten-year old 
daughter, living with her mother in California, and where 
the App e 1 1 ant i s now ma k i ng $ 2 , 14 8 • 0 0 per month ( T 2 1 4) 
(without consideration of the Appellant's new spouse adding 
to his family's support and maintenance of his household and 
earning substantial annual income) (T 18 8) , is not a 
reasonable basis upon which the Court could find a modifica-
tion of the child support with an increase of only $7 5. 00 
per month. 
If the Court would accept the logic of the Appellant to 
consider the increase of 250%, as being based purely upon 
inflationary costs (Appellant's Brief, p. 11), then this 
Court must find that it is also equitable to multiply the 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 9 
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original support of the $150.00 per month by the same 250%, 
which would compute child support at more than $375.00 per 
month.; 
POINT II. 
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO AN ADDITUR FOR 
REDUCTION OF CHILD SUPPORT BY APPELLANT. 
The Stipulation and subsequent Decree of Divorce 
between the Appellant and the Respondent provided for the 
Appellant to pay $150.00 per month child support, and $50.00 
per month alimony. (T 84) No provision in the Stipulation, 
nor the Decree of Divorce provided for the termination of 
the alimony upon remarriage of the Respondent. 
Nothing in the Utah Statutes, at the time of the 
remarriage of the Respondent, and up to the time of the 
divorce of the Respondent from her marriage to a Mr. Cooper, 
provided for automatic termination of alimony upon 
remarriage. Even the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, in 
the case of ~l~~~ !.:. ~ye!~' 62 Utah 90, 218 P. 128, had 
ruled that alimony was not necessarily terminated on 
remarriage of the wife, and it was not until the case of 
~us_!~~!.:. ~us_!~~' 2 Utah 2d 49, 269 P.2d 284, (1954) that 
the Supreme Court of Utah reversed its position, and 
provided by judicial fiat that alimony would terminate upon 
remarriage. The Utah Legislature did not, until 1979, 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 10 
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rev i s e the s ta tu t es to re f I e ct the de c i s i on s of th i s Co u r t 
under Title 30-3-5, U.C.A., as amended in 1979, by the 
additions of (2) and (3) thereto. 
The allegation that the Respondent committed willful 
fraud against the Appel !ant, by not revealing her remar-
riage, is not borne out by the testimony, in that the 
Respondent had no knowledge or reason to believe that mar-
riage had any effect whatsoever as to alimony, by reason of 
the failure of the Stipulation and the Decree of Divorce to 
make any reference whatsoever to a basis for termination of 
alimony. While Utah Case Law provided for termination of 
alimony on remarriage, except for certain other circum-
stances, it cannot be presumed that the Respondent had 
actual knowledge of court decisions of the Supreme Court of 
Utah, particularly by the fact that she had moved to and was 
residing in the State of California. 
The basis for the Respondent not advising the Appellant 
of the remarriage is best reflected in the record, wherein 
the Respondent testified in reference to the $150.00 per 
month child support and the $50.00 alimony, as follows: 
Q. Now in reference to the $200.00 
figure, could you briefly state to 
the court why you did not advise 
your husband~ former husband, of 
the remarriage, and why you con-
tinued to accept the $200.00? 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 11 
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A. Yes. From the time when we got 
divorced, Don would pay me 
sporadically. He frequently paid 
me with checks that bounced. He 
a -- this was most frequent at the 
beginning. Right after our divorce 
for about four months, he didn't 
pay me anything at all. At that 
time I made very little money, and 
I was totally dependent on the 
money from him. We informally 
worked out where he would say. to 
me, like he wasn't working, and so 
if I would take what he gave me, or 
I could take nothing, he would take 
me to court and have this lowered 
to nothing, and so I always worked 
under this threat. As the years 
went on, he became less irregular, 
and the last check that bounced I 
believe was in 1978. We never 
followed the Divorce Decree. 
Q. What do you mean you never followed 
that? 
A. Well, he was suppose to pay me 
before the 1st and before the 15th. 
He would never do that. He paid me 
sometimes more, sometimes 1 es s. I 
just took anything he would give 
me, and we never talked about the 
Divorce Decree. He pa id me any-
thing he felt like paying me, and I 
was very happy to get it. (T 85) 
There can be no scienter upon which to establish fraud, 
when the sole basis upon which the Respondent did not reveal 
the remarriage to the Appellant was not upon the basis of 
termination of alimony, but upon the basis of the threat of 
the Appellant to terminate child support upon remarriage of 
the Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 12 
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The Appellant, upon learning of the remarriage of the 
Respondent, commenced in July, 1980, to terminate payment of 
alimony, and also deduct without any order or petition 
through any court, the sum of $5 0. 00 per month from the 
meager child support, paying only $100.00 per month to the 
Respondent. (T 85) The Appellant was also made aware of the 
fact that the minor daughter in the custody of the Respon-
dent had a learning disability, and that the Respondent was 
substantially burdened in expenditures in an attempt to 
assist the child in overcoming her learning disability. 
(T 97) The Appellant also further refused to assist in 
paying any of the costs for orthodontic care necessitated 
for the ten-year old daughter (T 97), and as has been 
previously stated even dropped the health insurance required 
by the court to be maintained by the Appellant in accordance 
with the terms of the Decree of Divorce, requiring the 
Respondent to pay medical costs incurred during the period 
of non-insurability, and further requiring the Respondent to 
purchase heal th insurance for the minor daughter. (T 131, 
15 2) 
It is submitted that only upon proper application to 
the court, can the Appellant reduce the amount of child 
support previously set forth, by the Judgment of the court in 
regards to the payment of same. (~us!_~~ ~..:... ~us!_~~' ~UP_!:~) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 13 
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It is further submitted to the Court that having found 
that the Appellant's salary having increased from $800.00 to 
$2,148.00 per month, and the necessity and needs of a 
ten-year old child as against the amount awarded when the 
child was nine months of age, and in consideration of the 
increased costs of living, learning disabilities, health 
problems, necessity for orthodontic care, and the costs of 
living in Palo Alto, California, all would negate the court 
granting an increase of $75.00 per month, and then allowing 
the deduction of $50.00 per month from the child support to 
be paid back to the Appellant for alimony which was paid 
following the marriage of the Respondent, is totally 
inequitable without also granting to the Respondent the 
amount of monies which the Respondent was compelled to 
expend upon the minor child because of the failure of the 
Appellant to carry medical insurance for the minor daughter, 
as well as costs expended in overcoming learning disability 
of the child, and other costs and expenses resulting from 
the necessities for the minor daughter. 
The previous withholding by the Appellant of $50.00 per 
month for the child, and a subsequent order of the court 
finding that $225.00 per month is reasonable and fair 
support for the child, the deduction by the Appellant in the 
f i rs t ins t a nc e o f $ 5 O . 0 0 p e r month fr om the $ 15 0 . 0 0 per 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 14 
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month child support without any legal process whatsoever, 
and the allowance by the lower court of a continued deduc-
tion from reasonable child support of $50.00 per month until 
the amount paid by the Appellant to the Respondent as and 
for alimony during the period of time in which the Respon-
dent had become married, is improper, in that the Respondent 
is entitled to be paid the reasonable fair support of the 
child, as determined in the first instance by a stipulation 
and in the second instance by the finding of the lower court 
of a necessity for increase. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted to this Honorable Court that the 
Respondent did not, under any statement of the facts set 
forth in the record, commit fraud or deceit upon the 
Appellant, by continuing to receive $50.00 per month 
alimony, following the marriage of the Respondent. There is 
no evidence before the Court to arrive at a conclusion that 
the Court automatically used a schedule of any kind in 
determining the reasonable amount of child support due and 
owing by the Appellant for the support of the ten-year old 
daughter, and that the increase of $75.00 per month was 
minimal under the Statement of Earnings at the time of 
t r i a 1 , compared to the earnings as of the t i me o f s t i pu 1 a -
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 15 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tion in the original divorce proceedings, and as against the 
necessities of support of the minor daughter. Further, that 
the previous deduction of $50.00 per month unilaterally by 
the Appellant, and the continued deduction of $50.00 per 
month from the basic support deemed essential and minimum 
for the care of the minor daughter should be added by this 
court as a remitter, and that the Respondent should be com-
pensated for the reasonable attorney fees and costs and 
filinb of a Respondent's Brief to the Appeal of the 
Appe 11 ant, in that there was no substantial basis for the 
Appeal by the Appellant, and that it was in fact a frivolous 
Appeal for which the Respondent should not be compel led to 
pay additional attorney fees and costs based upon the 
superior income and wealth of the Appellant as against the 
financial status of the Respondent. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this c:<.£ day of May, 1982. 
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VLAHOS, PERKINS & SHARP 
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Legal Forum B ilding 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
----------------------
I HEREBY CERTI.FY that on this .::J./z_ day of May, 1982, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
Respondent's Brief, by placing same in the United States 
Mail, postage prepaid and addressed to the following: 
ROBERT M. TAYLOR 
BRAD L. SWANER 
SWANER AND TAYLOR 
Suite 722, Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(Attorneys for 
Defendant-Appellant) 
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